G
independent step, therefore, which His Majesty's Government may take at Canton will at once affect not only the rest of China but our relations with other Powers having interests in the Far East. The provocative attitude of the group of Extremists now in control at Canton may be deliberately calculated to provoke retaliatory measures whereby they hope to gain in popularity in their own country and to single out Great Britain as the oppressor of China. Such a development would be specially unfortunate at the present moment, when the Tariff Conference is about to meet at Peking and solidarity among the Powers and conviction of our good intentions on the part of the Chinese people are particularly necessary. Mr. Chamberlain will not hesitate to recommend strong action if and when it is considered that the situation would be permanently improved thereby. But he would prefer to take such action in concert with the other Powers whose treaty rights are equally at stake, and whom. as explained above, we are under an obligation to consult. He would be most reluctant to act alone except in circumstances where it would be clear to unprejudiced opinion that he had no reasonable alternative (letter to Colonial Office of the 5th September).
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As regards Sir J. Jamieson's proposal for a blockade of the Canton River, Sir Cecil Hurst wrote in a minute on F 3890 (the 20th August, 1925) as follows:-
"I assume that the Communist Government at Canton has not been recog nised in any way as a Government by His Majesty's Government, and also that the proposed blockade of Canton is not intended as an act of war, but merely as a method of applying coercion in order to oblige the Canton authorities to desist from their illegal action in attempting to interfere with the liberty of foreign steam vessels to exercise their treaty rights of trade at Canton. Action such as is proposed by Sir J. Jamieson in his telegram No. 10 can be taken by His Majesty's Government without prior application to the League; but if such action is taken, any member of the League. including China herself, will be entitled to bring the matter before the Council under article 11 (see paru- graph 2 of the article). If the action taken at Canton were a joint action with one or more of the other Great Powers, there would be the advantage that it would lessen the risk of trouble in the Council. It would diminish the chance of any attempt being made to isolate His Majesty's Government. All the Great Powers would be bound to stick together. If time allows, it might be well to call the attention of the Peking Government to these unjustifiable regulations which have been issued at Canton in breach of the treaty rights of the Powers. and warn it that unless it can secure their withdrawal within a specified time limit, the Powers would be obliged to take forcible measures. It would be diffi cult for the Government at Peking to protest to the Council at such action being taken by the Powers at Canton when it was rendered necessary by the failure of that Government to put an end to illegal action in its own territory." Other methods of dealing with Canton suggested at that time were :—
1.
Immediate examination of measures to be taken in order to permit the French and British consuls to face the situation created in Kwangtung by the recent actions of the Communist Government (French Ambassa dor's note of the 13th August): "A naval demonstration " (French Ambassador's note of the 15th August). We replied to M. de Fleuriau, on the 7th September, that it did not appear as though, at the present time, there were an immediate danger to the persons and property of foreigners in Canton, and that the Navigation Rules had been disavowed, but that if the position becomes suddenly worse, or if it appears to be drifting in a definitely dangerous direction," we might
have to consult further with his Government.
2. On the 21st August, in a telegram to the Admiralty, the Commander-in- chief suggested strong local action, involving an ultimatum to the C'anton Government that if normal trade conditions were not resumed within a short and definite period, the Bocca Tigris and Whampoa Forts, and also the Whampoa Military College would be bombed and destroved. The Admiralty informed us that from a technical point of view the action proposed was quite practicable and, indeed, an easy measure. rejected it, as we considered that if there were objections to a block the same objections existed in much greater force to a bombing! expedition.
But we
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3. Interception of vessels obeying strike committees regulations. This was proposed in a concrete instance by Sir J. Jamieson on the 19th August. The proposal was put up to us at 48 hours' notice, and, especially as it involved cargo belonging to a French firm, it was not approved.
4. The reference of the Canton incident to the League of Nations. This was suggested by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires. Peking, to His Majesty's consul-general, Canton (see Peking telegram No. 322 of the 20th August), who replied once more that, though the League of Nations might determine the facts, a stage had been reached when nothing short of abrogation of treaties would placate the local Government or end the strike.
5. A contribution not exceeding 1 million dollars, to be made from Hong Kong funds towards a scheme to support anti-Bolshevik parties in Canton (Colonial Office letter of the 22nd August). We have always strongly opposed the financing of Chinese parties, and we informed the Colonial Office that we could not approve of this proposal.
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On the 24th August Sir J. Jamieson telegraphed that there were signs of collapse of the Extremist Government at Canton. He had been approached through a foreign channel as to how the deadlock might be ended. He had suggested that the five demands made by the Canton Government after the incident of the 3rd June should be referred to Peking and that the Navigation Rules" should be disclaimed, thus allowing resumption of traffic between Hong Kong and Canton; this better outlook was confirmed by Peking on the 25th August. On the 26th August the Canton Government informed Sir J. Jamieson that they had neither published nor approved the Navigation Rules"; he accordingly suggested that a river steamship should be sent from Hong Kong to Canton as a test.
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At the end of August, therefore, there was sufficient reason to be optimistic,* although, as yet, there were no very definite signs of improvement. But about this time occurred the first of those obscure political moves in Canton city itself, which resulted in the overthrow of more moderate counsels, and an end of our hopes. On the 30th August, His Majesty's consul-general telegraphed that the military cadets and the strike committee had complete charge of the city; opposition to them was gathering, but that it was doubtful whether their (i.e.. anti-Communists") men would stand up against artillery and grenades.
On the 5th September His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Peking telegraphed (Peking telegram No. 357) as follows:-
(1.) The current of Chinese popular feeling is setting against Soviet intrigues in Canton and elsewhere. It is, therefore, quite possible that the Canton Government may soon fall without our intervention
(2) Revulsion of feeling would probably take place in favour of Canton if attacked from outside. I feel that Peking Government might well regar! blockade as violation of China's sovereign rights and also protest as a recogni- tion by foreign Powers of independence of Canton; and as one of the contracting Powers, China seems to me clearly entitled to prior consultation under article 7 of the Washington Treaty.
(3.) I am strongly of opinion that preliminary consultation with Japanese, American and French Governments would be preferable to immediate application to Washington Powers. I would suggest consultation with Italian Government, also, as they have ships here.”
message from His Majesty's consul-general, Canton:
On the 6th September Peking (in telegram No. 359) forwarded the following
and
The city is in the hands of cadets, labour and strike unions, and Russians, and is controlled by a Chinese triumvirate, whom it would be difficult to dislodge. A saner Chinese element would appreciate intervention, but I personally deprecate it as it would leave a legacy of hatred for the future. On the other hand, continuance of present state of things will bankrupt Hong Kong."
indicates that it had not yet developed its present degree of intensity.
Sir J. Jamieson's memorandum on the boycott (dated the 11th September) will be found in Annex X1,
Chiang Kai-shek (Cadet army), Wang Ching-wei (Labour Unions) and Hsu Chung-chi (Cantonese my). The first two are Extremists; the list belongs to the less extreme Kuomintang, and bis iufneace as consequently been waning.
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